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Abstract. The typical way to express the aim of science is to connect it with knowledge pursuit. This aim has 
been so strongly felt that sometimes typical scientific research has been called knowledge-inquiry. There 
is nothing wrong with knowledge as such. Especially when we have the knowledge of the highest quality, 
the scientific one, in mind. Still, science today should aim higher, surpass knowledge as its final goal and 
reach for wisdom. This brings about the need to implement wisdom-inquiry instead of knowledge-inquiry 
as Nicholas Maxwell has suggested. In order to succeed, the problems of living rather than the problems 
of knowledge have to be brought to the foreground.  
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Introduction
Scientific knowledge is believed to be an 
especially valuable creation of the human 
mind. Modern science has strongly been 
aimed at knowledge pursuit up to this day. 
the British philosopher of science Nicholas 
Maxwell has been calling contemporary 
scientific research knowledge-inquiry. This 
term is in full accord with the understand-
ing of science as standard empiricism. this 
notion has been explained by Maxwell in 
several books and papers at length and in 
detail (see, for instance, Maxwell 1974; 
1976; 1998; 2004). 
the topic has been addressed by Peeter 
Müürsepp (see Müürsepp 2011). In addi-
tion, the following analysis owes a lot to the 
conception of φ-science developed by rein 
Vihalemm (see, for instance, Vihalemm 
2001, 2007).
there is another aspect in what follows 
where rein Vihalemm is directly involved. 
Moving towards wisdom presupposes spe-
cial attention to practice as a crucial moment 
in the connection of human beings to objec-
tive reality and interactions with it. Practical 
realism initiated by rein Vihalemm is a 
major step forward in this respect.   
We are going to build on Nicholas Max-
well’s critique of standard empiricism and 
knowledge-inquiry. this brings Sir karl 
Popper into the picture. Maxwell is a fol-
lower of karl Popper’s critical rationalism 
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in its veiled form. However, Maxwell takes 
the stand that Popper’s critical rationalism 
does not enable to achieve a breakthrough 
in the academia that would enable the 
progress from knowledge-inquiry towards 
wisdom-inquiry. We shall take a closer look 
into this issue.
Science as Knowledge Pursuit
there wouldn’t be any need to abandon 
standard empiricism if it were a functioning 
approach for getting to know the world. It is 
true that the great achievements of contem-
porary science cannot be denied. adhering 
to knowledge-pursuit has enabled us to 
learn a lot about the world out there. It has 
helped us to build up a technologically ad-
vanced, at least to some extent, civilization. 
Still, all these great achievements have not 
brought about the solution of the so-called 
global problems as well as the problems of 
living, the problems that we human beings 
are facing in our lives most strongly and 
directly. this is the reason why something 
has to be changed in the whole approach 
to science. a fundamental change would 
hardly be possible without a revolution con-
cerning the basic aim of scientific research. 
there is nothing wrong with knowledge, 
especially the scientific one. The latter is a 
valuable achievement of the human mind 
that continues evolving. the corresponding 
philosophy of knowledge, however, does 
not enable science to reach for any higher 
goals. We are trapped in our knowledge 
pursuit.
What is the reason of the current situ-
ation? One might say that scientists and 
methodologists have been too strongly un-
der the spell of a special image created by 
physics. the problem is more complicated 
than it seems. Obviously, there is nothing 
wrong with physics as such in principle. 
It definitely is an ideal science in its own 
right. But it is a branch of working science, 
not a model. this fact puts physics into 
an ambiguous position. We, philosophers 
and methodologists of science, have been 
in need of a model for long already. For-
tunately, today we can say that the model 
has been provided. this is the model of 
φ-science of rein Vihalemm. the model 
has been explained in detail by its creator 
in different papers. Perhaps, the basic es-
sence of φ-science is one special property. 
Namely, its method is not simply hypothet-
ico-deductive but constructive-hypothetico-
deductive (Vihalemm 2001: 189). It has a 
technological origin in a way but mathemat-
ics plays at least as important part. rein 
Vihalemm explains: “Actually, φ-science, 
in the case of which we can suppose that 
objects must conform to our knowledge, 
or to be more precise, to the mathematical 
projection, becomes possible and justified 
thanks to the fact that in modern times the 
treatment of nature through technology 
acquires legitimacy” (Vihalemm 2001: 
189-190). And a few lines further on: 
“φ-science does not describe the “given” 
reality “as it is”, but does it only from the 
aspect of the laws of nature, constructing 
idealisations for this, which model the real-
ity from the viewpoint of the technological 
practicability of these idealisations” (Ibid.: 
190). the explanation provided by rein 
Vihalemm is marvellous for our current 
purpose. It helps us to see the disguised 
reason of the special power of knowledge 
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pursuit in modern science. Science fails to 
study the world as it really is in the sense 
of standard realism (see Vihalemm 2012). 
It rather takes the idealisations that fit into 
our structure and understanding of rigor-
ous knowledge as its objects of interest. 
this is the very reason of the entrapment 
mentioned above. We, methodologists of 
science, have been brought under the spell 
of physics as the only science proper. even 
more importantly, the efficiency of the 
scientific method has become dependent 
on the skilful construction of sophisticated 
idealisations ready for being studied with 
the help of the contemporary methods 
fine-tuned by the language of mathematics 
rather than the ability to be of real help to 
us humans in securing and developing the 
quality of our existence on planet earth. 
It is difficult to include practice based ap-
proach to worldly matters in knowledge-
inquiry of this type.
as a short side remark, we have to 
note that the understanding of physics as 
a constructive-hypothetico-deductive sci-
ence (φ-science) is indebted to Immanuel 
kant’s theoretical philosophy. Perhaps, this 
new understanding could even be called a 
revival of an old but largely forgotten ob-
servation. Here it might seem so because 
we are not taking an exhaustive view of the 
application of the model of φ-science in the 
philosophy of science but employing it just 
for our purpose, the purpose of explaining 
science as knowledge-pursuit in its limits. 
the conception of φ-science has a much 
broader scope. For instance, it is of great 
help in pointing out the special status of 
chemistry as partly a physics-like science 
(φ-science) as long as it deals with the 
laws of nature (of chemistry, not physics), 
partly not, as long as it deals with substances 
(stuff). last but not least, the model of 
φ-science helps us to understand the reach 
of the classical scientific method and even 
evaluate its suitability in the academia of the 
present day. a major question follows. Do 
we need to model each and every science 
after the example of physics? Perhaps there 
is an area of academic knowledge that can-
not be obtained by adhering to the classical 
method in principle. It may well be that 
social science and humanities, may be even 
the whole non-φ-science, has to find its own 
original foundation that is flexible enough 
for their needs. this is something that the 
genius from königsberg was not prepared 
to claim and could not be as social science 
did not exist in his days. But he continued 
to reach for higher goals, for wisdom. this 
task has largely been forgotten by the con-
temporary thinkers, be it philosophers of 
science or scientists themselves.  
knowledge alone would not help us to 
achieve interaction with reality. Practice 
has to be involved. Without stressing the 
role of practice we cannot start looking 
for wisdom. there are two main sources 
of practice-based approach in the history 
of philosophy – pragmatism and Marxism. 
Obviously, we could take just a very abstract 
look at wisdom, viewing it along the lines 
of the Heraclitean logos without any refer-
ence to practice. this is not the approach 
that we shall follow. Our understanding 
of wisdom will adhere to the position ex-
pressed by Nicholas Maxwell: “‘Wisdom’ 
may quite legitimately mean a variety of 
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things, depending on context, and the aim 
we have in mind. … by wisdom I mean the 
capacity, and active desire, to realize what 
is of value in life, for oneself and others, 
wisdom thus including knowledge, tech-
nological know-how and understanding, 
but much else besides” (Maxwell 2010: 
17). thus, for Maxwell, wisdom is rather 
connected to the practical ability of solving 
important problems of real life than high-
flying pondering about abstract categories. 
However, his call for a “New” Enlighten-
ment as a general intellectual environment 
necessary for the effective implementation 
of wisdom-inquiry is an original develop-
ment that builds on the Popperian critical 
rationalism.
Now we have to specify our under-
standing and approach to practice in 
the context of our movement towards 
wisdom-inquiry. there are different paths 
ready that we might follow. For instance, 
there is the practice-based philosophy of 
science developed by Joseph Rouse as a 
radical philosophical naturalism (1987; 
1996; 2002; 2003). there is the approach 
of Sami Pihlström of understanding prag-
matist philosophy of science as a variety of 
realism, the pragmatic one (1996; 2008). 
last but not least, there is the conception 
of practical realism of rein Vihalemm 
(2011). the latter, based on five main 
theses (Vihalemm 2011: 48) is the most 
appropriate one as a point of departure 
for the current treatment. the reason for 
this is Vihalemm’s proximity to Maxwell. 
Vihalemm has directly pointed out the 
connection, claiming that four of the main 
theses of practical realism are obviously 
important to Maxwell. Just the importance 
of the experiment has not attracted Max-
well’s special interest. the points about 
the role of scientific theories in practical 
research as well as the normative aspects 
of science are clearly important to Max-
well (Ibid.: 57).    
It is interesting to observe that the main 
reason of the untenable status of standard 
empiricism, pointed out by Maxwell, is not 
that it is too far from empirical reality but 
rather an abstract and general issue. Namely, 
as Nicholas Maxwell insists, in order to 
secure constant development of science 
we need to find an underlying unifying 
metaphysical assumption.
Science as Knowledge-Inquiry
In the previous section we have singled 
out the main reason for understanding sci-
ence proper as knowledge pursuit. It is the 
spell of physics-likeness. Modern physics 
as we know it and appreciate its achieve-
ments is effective in itself but should not be 
presented as a model for other branches of 
science. It is based on the activity of con-
structing the research object for itself along 
the lines of knowledge pursuit. the object 
had to be knowable. Such methodological 
approach is almost perfect for acquiring 
new knowledge but prevents the researcher 
to go beyond that task. this has all been said 
in general terms without a direct reference 
to any particular thinker. In the current sec-
tion, however, we are going to take a look 
into the essence of Nicholas Maxwell’s 
knowledge-inquiry.
Maxwell’s critique of knowledge is 
sharp. Maxwell admits that the aim of 
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acquiring new knowledge with the help of 
the scientific method should be helping to 
promote human welfare (Ibid.: 26). From 
this very standpoint, however, knowledge-
inquiry can be called damagingly irra-
tional (Ibid.: 27). This statement can be 
explained with the help of the so-called 
rules of rational problem-solving. they 
are as follows:
(1) articulate, and try to improve the 
articulation of, the problem to be 
solved.
(2) Propose and critically assess possible 
solutions.
(3) When necessary, break recalcitrant 
problems into easier-to-solve pre-
liminary, subordinate, specialized 
problems.
(4) Interconnect basic and specialized 
problem-solving so that each may 
guide the other. (Ibid.: 30)
according to Maxwell, knowledge-
inquiry violates three of these four rules. 
the same applies to the whole academic 
inquiry as it exists today (Ibid.: 30). Here, 
Maxwell shows up his direct orientation 
on the need to have practical interaction 
with reality in the course of scientific re-
search in order to enable at least address-
ing the problems of living and problems 
of action. Otherwise, we remain trapped 
in knowledge pursuit without an interest 
in reaching for any further goals. after 
all, science should produce something of 
value. knowledge, even theoretical one, 
can be taken as value in itself. a good 
question would be, however, do we need 
a value in itself that is not even aesthetic? 
this would not help to solve our problems 
of living.
knowledge inquiry cannot address the 
problems of living in principle. It is re-
stricted to tackling the problems of knowl-
edge. Coming back to the rules of rational 
problem-solving, Maxwell claims that the 
only rule knowledge-inquiry can obey, 
even put it into practice, is rule number (3) 
(Ibid.: 31–32). All three of the other rules, 
however, are beyond reach for knowledge-
inquiry. The case of the first two rules is 
especially interesting. there seems to be 
nothing particular about these rules. Nev-
ertheless, Maxwell finds that knowledge-
inquiry fails to implement these rules. the 
core of the failure lies in the scope of the 
term ‘problem’ here. knowledge-inquiry 
is definitely able to articulate, solve and 
assess the solutions of the problems of 
knowledge. But this is where it stops.
assessment of the philosophy of karl 
Popper may suggest another conclusion 
to us. Critical rationalism of Sir karl was 
clearly focused on an effort that can be di-
rectly connected to rules number (1) and 
(2). In his very basic book Popper writes: 
“the one method of all rational discus-
sion, and therefore of the natural sciences 
as well as philosophy … is that of stating 
one’s problem clearly and of examining 
its various proposed solutions critically” 
(Popper 1959: 16). As Popper states here, 
his method applies to both natural sciences 
and philosophy. But this is not the main 
point here. One might say that the core of 
the matter is not connected to overstress-
ing the role of natural sciences but rather 
an opposite one. Popper is famous for his 
severe criticism of specialisation. this is 
what prevented him from putting rules (3) 
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and (4) into action. Maxwell has an inter-
esting observation here. His point is that 
Popper was too much opposed to special-
ization to appreciate that it can be seen as 
a vital component of rationality, that the 
potentially harmful effects of specializa-
tion can be counteracted by implementing 
rule (4) (Ibid.: 30). The point is well taken 
as Popper’s opposition to specialism was 
really notorious to say the least: “If the 
many, the specialists, gain the day, it will 
be the end of science as we know it – of 
great science. It will be a spiritual catas-
trophe comparable in its consequences to 
nuclear armament” (Popper 1994: 72). As 
a matter of fact, Maxwell’s own opposi-
tion to knowledge-inquiry is very similar 
to Popper’s ‘fear’ of increasing special-
ism. However, he is not that strict concern-
ing the situation with respect to rule (3): 
“Knowledge-inquiry, as pursued in univer-
sities today, does, however, put rule (3) into 
practice to a quite extraordinary extent” 
(Ibid.: 32). Still, things remain in very bad 
state as far as all the other three rules are 
concerned. thus, knowledge-inquiry is not 
able to tackle the crises in modern life, to 
give priority to the problems of living over 
the problems of knowledge. 
Maxwell calls our current state of af-
fairs concerning academic inquiry dam-
agingly irrational. Perhaps we should be 
somewhat fairer towards rationality here. 
It is hardly the divide between rational-
ity and irrationality that is at stake here. 
knowledge-inquiry is very rational in 
a way. We have a rationally constructed 
method we can follow while developing 
science as knowledge pursuit. We can 
even apply a quite rigorous model, that of 
φ-science, as we saw above. In this sense 
we could rather say that knowledge-in-
quiry is even too rational. the picture is 
different, however, if we take a broader 
look at rationality, viewing it as a philo-
sophical conception or a methodological 
approach, i.e., aim-oriented rationality of 
Maxwell. But the final goal is still wis-
dom.
Science as Wisdom-Inquiry
the switch from knowledge-inquiry to 
wisdom-inquiry can be astonishingly sim-
ple. It can be defined as an approach that 
enables us to put all the four rules of ratio-
nal problem solving into practice. as we 
see, rationality cannot be abandoned but 
should be overcome, should be implement-
ed in a reasonable way. this may sound as 
a tautology, but nevertheless. In addition, 
it might be reasonable to reformulate the 
first two rules we are dealing with:
(1) articulate, and seek to improve the 
articulation of, those personal, social 
and global conflicts and problems of 
living we need to resolve in order to 
realize what is of value in life (my 
italics – P. M.);
(2) Propose and critically assess possible 
increasingly cooperative actions 
designed, if performed, to enable us 
to solve our problems, realize what 
is of value of life (Maxwell 2010: 
34).
there is one crucial observation to be 
made here. knowledge-inquiry takes phys-
ics (or φ-science) as its ideal model. In the 
case of wisdom-inquiry, this does not work 
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any longer. the switch from knowledge-in-
quiry to wisdom-inquiry does not require a 
big change in the vocabulary but a revolu-
tion in the understanding of the academia. 
Physics alone cannot put rules (1) and (2) 
into practice in principle. It can resolve its 
own problems, the problems of physics but 
not the problems of living. Social science 
and humanities have to occupy the centre-
piece. But it is not just about changing po-
sitions in the academic structure. 
the whole approach to social science 
has to change by its essence. Social sci-
ence has been understood as doing re-
search into society just like physics is do-
ing it into nature. at the same time it has 
been a constant worry that social science 
is not well established (does not include 
paradigms), is not successful enough as 
far as research results are concerned, 
etc. there may be a substantial reason 
for this. What if the whole approach has 
been flawed? After all, society consisting 
of human individuals is quite a different 
object to study than nature, even with re-
spect to life sciences. But this is not the 
main issue here. Social inquiry, including 
all branches of social science, has been 
pursued as knowledge-inquiry so far. It 
has been the claims of knowledge about 
some special social issues that has been 
the outcome of such traditional social in-
quiry. One can hardly claim that obtain-
ing such kind of knowledge makes no 
sense whatsoever. But still it need not and 
perhaps should not be the main task of a 
social scientist. We tend to forget about 
our practical needs when we remain fo-
cused on knowledge. according to Max-
well, social inquiry should be not about 
claims to knowledge but rather proposals 
for action (Maxwell 2010: 38). Is it really 
as simple as that?
there is an important gap here from 
the point of view of contemporary aca-
demia. Many social scientists are actually 
interested in practical action, in providing 
service to society. But this is not what the 
academia expects from them. the evaluat-
ing criteria of researchers, either in natural 
or social science, are tied to bibliometrical 
data. Nothing more, except publications in 
peer-reviewed journals and citation index-
es is considered important. these criteria 
have mostly been worked out by natural 
scientists based on their own research tra-
ditions where most of the work has been 
done in laboratories in research groups and 
published by multiple authors who work 
on the basis of well-established methods. 
Such approach would not do much harm to 
natural sciences themselves. In the case of 
social inquiry, however, the outcome has 
been devastating. People who are active 
in socialia and humaniora are prevented 
from addressing the society not to speak 
of having a dialogue with it. another result 
of the gap is the distrust of social scientists 
among the politicians. the matter is two-
sided here. Social scientists have failed in 
predicting different global phenomena in 
politics and economy, like dissolution of 
the Soviet Union or the recent financial cri-
ses. It may well be, however, that these fail-
ures have also happened as the results of 
deeply flawed approach to social issues in 
the academia. Perhaps, more practice ori-
ented approach to economic cycles or po-
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litical and cultural unrest, i.e. combining of 
knowledge obtained with the help of differ-
ent branches of social science, would have 
enabled to come up with more adequate 
preview of the upcoming developments. 
Obviously, the latter is just a hypothesis 
that can hardly be tested in retrospect. 
anyway, if these considerations have 
at least some rational grounding then call-
ing knowledge-inquiry into doubt, to put it 
softly, by Maxwell is well justified. It has 
to be replaced with another attitude at least 
as far as social research is concerned. Why 
not call it wisdom-inquiry?
Now it is high time to take a closer 
look at wisdom-inquiry. What is it after 
all? We shall adhere to the definition of 
wisdom given above that gives a clear dis-
tinction. knowledge-inquiry focuses on 
the theoretical side, the quest for knowl-
edge as such. there is no pressure from 
the practice side at all. But as soon as we 
bring practice into the picture, we have 
a new quality. We can break through the 
constraint of theoretical knowledge and 
aim at a new type of dialogue between 
humans and nature, the one that acknowl-
edges practice as an essential feature of 
our connections to the world. It does not 
really matter whether we decide to adhere 
to the Marxist or pragmatist understand-
ing of practice here.
Wisdom-inquiry necessarily needs to 
tackle the great problems of learning. as 
Maxwell explains, we don’t really have 
two distinct problems here. there are rath-
er two sides of the same coin. They are: 
learning about the universe and ourselves 
as a part of it and learning how to become 
civilized (Maxwell 2010: 164). Modern 
science that was started in the 17th century 
laid the foundation for solving the first 
part of the problem. the method of mod-
ern science was proposed as the means of 
constantly improving knowledge and un-
derstanding of the natural world. this has 
really happened and has brought about a 
cascade of technological discoveries or at 
least developed hand in hand with techno-
logical progress. this writer is convinced 
that without modern science by its side, 
contemporary technological civilization 
would not have been possible. 
What about becoming civilized? Max-
well holds that we have not succeeded so 
far. He points out a crucial question: “Can 
we learn from our solution to the first 
great problem of learning how to solve 
the second problem?” (Ibid.: 166). The 
answer is ‘yes’ but we haven’t managed 
yet. In order to give a thorough treatment 
of the question ‘why’, we need to follow 
Maxwell into the enlightenment. after 
all, enlightenment was supposed to lead 
the humans into a civilization of a higher 
level where the social problems of each 
and every human being were to be brought 
to the foreground. We have to admit that 
the enlightenment managed to go only 
half way through. Mistakes of reasoning 
were made. Maxwell calls them blunders. 
the leaders of the classical enlightenment 
have blundered concerning all three main 
points that have to be got right in order to 
achieve social progress towards a civilized 
world. These are the three things:
1. the progress-achieving methods of 
science have to be correctly identi-
fied.
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2. these methods have to be correctly 
generalized so that they become 
fruitfully applicable to any worth-
while, problematic human endeav-
our, whatever the aims may be, and 
not just applicable to the endeavour 
of improving knowledge.
3. the correctly generalized progress-
achieving methods then have to be 
exploited correctly in the great hu-
man endeavour of trying to make 
social progress towards an enlight-
ened, civilized world (Maxwell 
2010: 168).
We are not going the tackle ‘these 
things’ one after another individually. We 
shall rather try to get to the heart of the mat-
ter from the philosophy of science point of 
view. the main point cannot be made with-
out referring to karl Popper. the essence 
of his critical rationalism is accounting for 
the progress of science. Science puts into 
practice the method of proposing theories 
as conjectures, which are then subjected to 
sustained attempted empirical refutation 
(Popper 1959; 1963). Popper’s generaliza-
tion of the method is his critical rational-
ism. Despite this remarkable achievement 
of Popper, according to Maxwell, his ideas 
are seriously defective (Maxwell 2010: 
174). Popper has failed to see the prob-
lematic aim of science and thus his critical 
rationalism can be criticized. “It does not 
make improving aims and methods, when 
aims are problematic, an essential aspect of 
rationality” (Ibid.: 174). This is the crucial 
issue in the context of progressing from 
knowledge-inquiry towards wisdom-in-
quiry. Maxwell’s point is that karl Popper 
as a ‘philosopher of knowledge’ managed 
only to go half way through concentrating 
just on the laws, theories and hypotheses, 
submitting them to everlasting testing. But 
Popper did not pay enough attention to the 
methods themselves. this would be a con-
troversial point unless an important obser-
vation. In a really critical and aim-oriented 
approach we need to accept that not only 
the methods are problematic but the aims 
as well. this observation is even more 
important if we are looking outside of the 
boundaries of science into the problems of 
living. Obviously, the aims are problematic 
not only in science. the New enlighten-
ment aims rather at solving the problems of 
living. But we’ll remain with science in the 
context of turning it into wisdom-inquiry.
Nicholas Maxwell wants to turn the 
whole building of science upside down 
making a new foundation of social inquiry 
and the humanities. Physics will still be 
there but not the foundation or a model to 
anything else any longer. By all evidence, 
some rigour should be lost here. But Max-
well claims that rigour would be gained, 
that wisdom-inquiry would be more rigor-
ous than knowledge-inquiry has ever been. 
Without clarifying this point there would 
be no hope to understand the essence of 
wisdom-inquiry. knowledge-inquiry typi-
cally demands that emotions and desires, 
values, human ideals and aspirations, 
philosophies of life be excluded from the 
intellectual domain of inquiry. Wisdom-
inquiry requires all this to be included 
(Ibid.: 182). It is true that if we want to 
discover what is of value in life we cannot 
do without human feelings and desires. 
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How to accomplish this without ending up 
with something very individual and sub-
jective without real objective generalizing 
power? Maxwell believes that subject-
ing feelings, desires and values to critical 
scrutiny would help. Obviously, we need 
to be aware of the difference between feel-
ing good and being good. But what are the 
neutral criteria for making this distinction. 
Perhaps, such can be figured out but will 
they be universally applicable? Maxwell 
explains further: “Wisdom-inquiry em-
bodies a synthesis of traditional rational-
ism and romanticism” (Ibid.: 182). Thus, 
Maxwell admits that rationalism in the 
traditional way, the approach that takes its 
inspiration from science and the scientific 
method, is still present in wisdom-inqui-
ry. In addition to that, art should have a 
fundamental rational role in inquiry. How 
can this be understood? In Maxwell’s un-
derstanding art plays an important role in 
revealing what is of value, including un-
masking false values (Ibid.: 183). That’s 
how romanticism comes in. the point of 
having the need of an interplay between 
mind and heart may be well taken but it 
is still difficult to see a development to-
wards increasing rigour here, at least in 
the conventional understanding of rigour. 
unless, we have just managed to take a 
fresh and perhaps more discursive (less 
dark and veiled) look at something that 
Martin Heidegger has argued for already. 
The German thinker has stated: “The hu-
manistic sciences, in contrast, indeed all 
the sciences concerned with life, must 
necessarily be inexact in order to remain 
rigorous” (Heidegger 1977: 120). There is 
a special kind of rigour present in Heide-
gger’s approach. But Heidegger does not 
apply such understanding of rigour to sci-
ences not concerned with life, i.e., phys-
ics. In the case of Maxwell, however, we 
can rather see the attempt to apply the 
‘rigour of wisdom-inquiry’ to the whole 
enterprise of science, physics (φ-science) 
included. He intends to take a vast step 
further compared to what Heidegger was 
up to. the latter seems to have simply ac-
cepted the standard empiricist character of 
mathematical research into nature. Max-
well’s wisdom-inquiry cannot accept such 
attitude.
Once again it appears that the core of 
the matter is in physics. In order to imple-
ment wisdom-inquiry, the whole approach 
of doing research in physics has to be rev-
olutionized. Something important in addi-
tion to pure rationality has to be accepted 
by the physicists. Here, the question is not 
about emotions or desires. rather, at least 
some metaphysical assumption about the 
world has to be accepted before putting 
empiricism into practice. Making this cru-
cial step that even metaphysically minded 
Heidegger did not notice seems to be the 
Gordian knot of the revolution endorsed 
by Maxwell.
Conclusion
Our conclusion is short. the aim of sci-
ence can be knowledge if we take the tra-
ditional narrow look at science limiting it 
to physics-likeness (φ-science). knowl-
edge is important but it wouldn’t help us to 
address properly, not to speak about solv-
ing, the problems of living – the practical 
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problems of our concern. In order to make 
science, this wonderful creation of the 
human mind, something of real benefit 
to human existence, it has to function as 
wisdom-inquiry rather than knowledge-
inquiry.  
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Santrauka. Mokslo tikslas paprastai išreiškiamas siejant jį su žinojimo siekiu. Šis tikslas juntamas taip stipriai, 
jog kartais net ir tipinis mokslinis tyrimas vadinamas į pažinimą orientuotu tyrinėjimu (angl. knowledge-inquiry). 
Žinojimas savaime nėra blogas dalykas. Ypač kai galvoje turima aukščiausioji žinojimo kokybė – mokslinis 
žinojimas. Tačiau šiandieną mokslas turėtų kelti aukštesnius tikslus – peržengti žinojimą kaip galutinį tikslą 
ir siekti išminties. Taip atsiranda poreikis vietoje į pažinimą orientuoto tyrinėjimo vykdyti į išmintį orientuotą 
tyrinėjimą (angl. wisdom-inquiry), kaip siūlė Nicholas Maxwellas. Norint užtikrinti sėkmę, pirmame plane 
turi atsidurti ne žinojimo, bet gyvenimo problemos.
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